138 parties have not yet agreed on rule 42 (vote) of the draft rules of procedure, which have been applied since 1996, with the exception of rule 42. In the absence of agreement, decisions are taken by consensus. See draft rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies in FCCC/CP/1996/2 (22 May 1996). Consensus has been identified in Article 15(3) and Article 7(2)(k) and Articles 13(5), 20(3) and 21(4) of the Kyoto Protocol as the preferred decision-making method. 45 Decisions which `take note` of such an information document do not preclude the rights, interests and obligations of the non-Contracting Parties and may therefore be admissible, but decisions intended to create rights and obligations, in so far as they may appear in a cop decision, will become inadmissible for non-Contracting Parties without the express agreement of the non-Contracting State. In the context of the extension of article 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980) 8 ILM 679. 39 Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, for example, provides for a commitment of +8% and, for Australia, a limitation on the growth of greenhouse gases. . 62 See paragraphs 36 with paragraphs 49 and 59, LCA Outcome Decision.
8 Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, in the report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session Addendum, part two: Activities of the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth session, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (hereinafter the Copenhagen Accord). See General Bodansky, D, “The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference”: A Postmortem (2010) 104 AJIL 2,230CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Rajamani, L, “The Making and Unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord” (2010) 59 ICLQ 3,824Google Scholar. . 142 See report of the Conference of the Parties on its second session, Geneva, 8-19 July 1996, FCCC/CP/1996/15 (29 October 1996). . Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol provides, for example, for stabilisation commitments for Russia, Ukraine and New Zealand. 4, Article 3(9) of the Kyoto Protocol. See for an overview of the climate regime P Birnie, A Boyle and C Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (CUP, Cambridge, 2009) 356-378. 153 The Presidents have the power to close the debates, Rule 23(2) of the draft Rules of Procedure as applied (No 138). 41 See Vidal, J, `Cancun Climate Change Summit: Japan refuses to extend Kyoto Protocol` The Guardian (1 December 2010Google Scholar) and Goldenberg, S, `Cancun Climate Change Conference: Russia will not renew Kyoto Protocol` The Guardian (10 December 2010)Google Scholar. 86 See paragraph 43, LCA Outcome Decision and Article 5(1) of the Kyoto Protocol. .
160 The enabling clause contained in the Treaty may make a decision of the COP compulsory, but in the absence of such decisions, the decisions of the COP are not formally legally binding, cf. Brunnée, J`COPing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements`, (2002) 15 LJIL 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar. 72 Cf. z.B. Letters from Brazil of 29 January 2010, China of 28 January 2010, India of 30 January 2010 and South Africa of 29 January 2010. 140 Cf. (z.B. Article 161(8)(e) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397; by. II (A)2, Rules of Procedure of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 November 2006, MC.DOC/1/06; Footnote 1 on Article 2.4, Dispute Settlement Rules: Agreement on Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, reproduced in 33 ILM 1226 (1994); Rule 11, Rules of Procedure of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, 22 October 2007. .